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“[I]t has become much harder to negotiate good deals for flights from 
Paris and Frankfurt since immunity was granted.”
Travel manager of a big European Bank (2009)1
1.  Introduction
A crucial feature of the airline industry is that the level of demand on most city-pair markets is not  
sufficient to sustain regular non-stop services.  The airlines’ response has been to operate hub-and-
spoke networks, channeling passengers via one or several airports (hubs).  While in the US domestic 
airline industry most of the travelers do not have to change the operating carrier en route, the situation 
is  very different on the international markets,  where scale and regulatory restrictions do not allow 
setting up ‘mega-airlines’ with networks encompassing the entire world.  The carriers’ response has 
been to form partnerships to facilitate interline trips by the consumers.  A number of such partnerships 
on the routes originating from the USA operate under ‘antitrust immunity’, which allows the carriers to 
jointly make scheduling and pricing decisions on the corresponding joint networks; revenue sharing 
may also be allowed.2
International airline partnerships operating under antitrust immunity provide a nice setup for an 
empirical investigation of market foreclosure – a practice that generally involves denying the actual or 
potential competitors access to either an essential input or customers, thereby preventing them from 
competing.  Antitrust immunity can lead to market foreclosure, as respective alliance members will be 
reluctant to accept interline passengers from the outside airlines.  In fact, such a concern has been 
specifically raised by American Airlines – the carrier claimed that it has become more difficult for it to 
feed its passengers to Air France’s flights at Paris Charles de Gaulle airport following the granting of 
antitrust immunity to the Air France – Delta partnership within the Skyteam alliance3.  Foreclosing on 
the outside carriers is a perfectly rational strategy for the alliance members, as it not only increases 
their revenue (the passenger spends all his/her money ‘within’ the alliance), but also lowers their cost 
via  economies of traffic  density (and increases the rivals’ cost for the same reason)4.   Foreclosure 
strategies can be implemented either by a direct refusal to deal, or by setting prohibitively high fees for  
1  All together now – Why antitrust immunity granted in Washington may not wash in Europe, The Economist, Oct 29 th 
2009. 
2  Although we will  use the term ‘antitrust  immunity’ (which refers  to US antitrust  laws) throughout the paper,  our 
analysis also applies to the European context.
3 Report of James D. Reitzes, Dorothy Robyn & Kevin Neels (The Brattle Group), Docket No. OST-2004-19214, (June 24,  
2005).
4  On the margin, if a connecting passenger comes from within your alliance rather than from the outside, your load factor 
increases, and that of your rival falls, which (due to economies of traffic density) increases the difference between your  
per passenger cost and your rival’s.
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accepting such passengers.  Whatever the exact mechanism, the end result will be higher traffic by the 
partner airlines with antitrust immunity, and lower traffic by the outside airlines on routes to/from the 
partner airlines’ hub airports.  This is the contention tested in this study.5
We find clear support for our hypothesis in the data.  Our estimation results indicate that outside 
airlines carry up to eight percent fewer passengers to immunized alliance members’ hubs as compared 
to other routes within their networks.  At the same time, antitrust immunity increases traffic on routes 
operated by the respective member airlines out of their hubs by over four percent (as compared to the 
otherwise equal outside airlines’ services), and leads to a dramatic (up to 25 percent) increase in total 
passenger volume on the routes between the alliance members’ hub airports.  The same effects, half the 
size of those estimated for the passenger volumes, are observed for the frequency of flights.  Traffic 
between the hubs of competing alliances is generally similar to that of the outside airlines.  Net effects 
(in  terms  of  passenger  volumes  and  frequency  of  service)  of  this  foreclosure  vary  for  different 
categories of markets, and are either ambiguous (at worst implying a small reduction in traffic with 
potentially anti-competitive outcomes), or indicate higher total traffic. A detailed welfare analysis is 
outside the scope of this study, as comprehensive pricing data for international airline markets are not 
available. Routes where foreclosure stipulated by the antitrust immunity may hurt consumers have not 
been previously viewed as such where airline alliances could create a potential for welfare losses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section is a primer on the antitrust 
economics of market foreclosure, followed by an overview of the role of antitrust immunity for airline 
alliances.  This  is  complemented  by  a  discussion  of  the  link  between  foreclosure  and  airline 
partnerships. Subsequently,  we describe the data,  present and discuss the data analysis  results,  and 
conclude.  Some of the information and tables are in the Appendix.
2.  Market Foreclosure and Antitrust: Fundamentals
Market foreclosure involves denying actual or potential competitors access to either an essential input 
or customers, and thereby preventing them from competing.  The tools in the foreclosing firm’s toolbox 
include  vertical  integration  with  competitors,  refusal  to  deal,  exclusive  arrangements,  and  price 
discrimination.  In either case, the visible outcome of such interaction is lower quantity (market share) 
of the firm being foreclosed on.  The general concept of foreclosure can be of relevance in no fewer 
5 Among others, Reitzes and Moss (2008) identify anti-competitive foreclosure as the result of antitrust immunity to airline  
alliances as a policy relevant issue.   
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than four areas of antitrust policy: mergers and acquisitions, monopolization, vertical restraints, and 
horizontal agreements (Steuer, 2008).  With respect to mergers and acquisitions, we can distinguish 
between input  foreclosure and customer foreclosure.   Input  foreclosure involves the upstream firm 
restricting access to its input to the downstream rivals.  This raises downstream rivals’ costs and so 
reduces competition at the downstream level,  leading to higher prices downstream.  In the case of 
customer foreclosure, the downstream firm restricts its purchases from upstream firm’s rivals, leading 
to the loss of economies of scale – and therefore higher prices – for the upstream rivals.  This in turn  
allows the downstream firms to raise their prices.  Although both theoretical concepts are based on 
sound economics (Ordover, Salop & Saloner (1990, 1992); Riordan (1998)), antitrust investigations 
need to show the ability to foreclose, the incentive to foreclose, and whether such a foreclosure strategy 
would have a significant detrimental effect on competition downstream (European Commission, Non-
horizontal  merger  guidelines,  para.  32).   Generally,  foreclosure as  such is  not  necessarily an  anti-
competitive practice, but may very well be socially beneficial in certain circumstances such as free-
riding by the downstream units or excessive entry (Rey and Tirole, 2007).
In fact, empirical studies of market foreclosure generally point to the dominance of the pro-
competitive effects of this practice.  Mullin and Mullin (1997) argue that US Steel’s acquisition of one 
of its suppliers led to substantial efficiency gains rather than market foreclosure.  Slade (1998) shows 
that divestiture of pubs by breweries – effective removal of possibility of foreclosure – yielded higher 
prices for beer at  pubs.  More recently,  Hortacsu and Syverson (2007) found no evidence of anti-
competitive effects of vertical foreclosure in the cement and ready-mixed concrete industries; instead, 
the authors suggest that vertical integration yields lower prices, higher quantity, and does not create any 
additional entry barriers.  Shenoy (2008), using an event study analysis covering a large sample of 
mergers, claims that efficiency is the main rationale for mergers.  Derdenger (2009) studies foreclosure 
in the video game console industry, and suggests it is pro-competitive.  An opposing side is represented 
by Hastings’ (2004) study of the gasoline market in Southern California. The author showed that the 
takeover of independent Thrifty stations by ARCO resulted in higher gasoline prices at  the nearby 
stations, indicating lower competition following the vertical integration.  
3.  Airline Alliances and Antitrust Immunity
Airline  partnerships  are  not  a  recent  development  in  the  commercial  passenger  airline  industry. 
Capacity,  cost  and revenue sharing arrangements  have been commonly wired into the bilateral  air 
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service agreements regulating (and severely restricting) competition on the international markets since 
World War II.  Airline partnerships in their modern form started appearing in the early 1990s, with 
airlines coordinating their handling of interline passengers via agreements of various types.  The most 
common  and  policy  relevant  form of  such  agreements  involves  codesharing,  whereby  flights  are 
assigned the partner  airlines’ flight  number(s),  and are effectively incorporated into those carriers’ 
networks.  Such services are oftentimes jointly marketed by the partner airlines, and are sometimes 
supplemented with blocked-space arrangements, whereby a certain number of seats on the flight are 
sold directly by the partner airline.   Multi-airline codesharing agreements led to emergence of the 
global airline alliances, each of which started from a partnership between a US and an EU carrier.  
Oneworld developed around the partnership between American Airlines and British Airways; Skyteam 
evolved from the Delta Air Lines – Air France alliance; and the current Star Alliance is the expanded 
United Airlines – Lufthansa partnership.
Looking for more freedom to coordinate various aspects of their joint operations, the partner 
airlines  sought  antitrust  immunity,  or  the  right  to  jointly  set  fares  throughout  their  international 
networks, as well as to establish revenue-sharing agreements.  This aspect of the airline partnerships is 
actually not understood too well in the literature.  A number of theoretical models (e.g.  Park, 1997, 
Brueckner,  2001,  Brueckner  and Whalen,  2000) model  the alliances  as  effective  mergers.   Of the 
empirical  studies  of  international  airline  partnerships  (Oum  et  al.,  1996,  Park  and  Zhang,  2000, 
Brueckner  and  Whalen,  2000,  Whalen,  2007,  Brueckner,  2003)  only  the  latter  two  attempt  to 
empirically distinguish the effect of the antitrust immunity on airfares.
Between 1992 and 2009, the US DOT investigated 35 applications for antitrust immunity for 
the international services of various airline alliances.6 Only three applications were disapproved7 by the 
US DOT, two are pending (as of February 2009), and two applications were dismissed on request of the 
airlines before a final decision was announced. All of the remaining 28 applications were approved 
subject to conditions.  Excluding the twelve applications of alliances without any involvement of a 
European carrier  leaves 16 approved transatlantic applications for antitrust  immunity.   All antitrust 
immunity granting decisions that fall into the time period covered by our data are described in the 
Appendix.8
6  The only domestic airline alliance investigated by the DOT was between Aloha Airlines and Hawaiian Airlines in 2002.
7 American Airlines - British Airways (1999), American Airlines - British Airways (2002), Delta Air Lines - Northwest  
Airlines - Air France - Alitalia - CSA Czech Airlines - KLM (2006)
8  Between 1994 and 2008, the European Commission investigated 21 cases of proposed airline alliances. However, 10 
out of the 21 cases had a solely European focus and are therefore of no particular interest here. Of the remaining 11 
transatlantic  alliance applications,  at  the beginning of  2010 four applications (including the three remaining global  
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Antitrust immunity represents a higher degree of cooperation than codesharing agreements, and 
changes  the  airlines’  incentives  with  respect  to  the  acceptance  of  interline  passengers.  While 
codesharing – either with or without antitrust immunity – does not technically preclude an airline from 
accepting interline passengers from the non-partner airlines, immunity makes market foreclosure more 
likely.  An airline accepting an interline passenger on its flight both increases its revenue and lowers per 
passenger  cost  via  economies  of  traffic  density.   Antitrust  immunity,  when  supplemented  with  a 
revenue  sharing  agreement,  is  equivalent  to  joint  profit  maximization9,  and  therefore  strongly 
discourages accepting interline passengers from outside airlines.  Even in case of antitrust immunity 
without  explicit  network-wide  revenue  sharing10,  partner  airlines  can  share  the  revenue  from the 
interline fares in such a way as to foreclose the market for outside carriers.  Antitrust immunity allows 
the partner airlines to effectively set “transfer prices” for the interline itineraries within the alliance.  As 
an example, suppose airline A can feed its traffic to either carrier B or C.  Suppose the total fares for the 
A-B and A-C interline trips are the same.  Then, if airlines A and B have antitrust immunity, they can 
split the interline fares in such a way that airline A obtains a disproportionately large share of the total 
interline fare for feeding its passengers to its partner carrier B.  This arrangement can be reciprocal, so 
that airline B will recoup the losses by receiving the disproportionately large share of the total fare for 
feeding traffic to airline A.  This kind of “transfer prices” can eliminate the non-alliance airline C as a 
competitor.
Note that with a simple codesharing the above described agreement is not feasible, as explicit 
coordination of prices for the interline trips is not allowed.  Besides, it should be noted that the non-
acceptance of the interline passengers from carriers outside of the immunized alliance increases the 
respective airlines’ cost due to lower load factors, again working through economies of traffic density.
4.  Antitrust Immunity and Foreclosure
The possibility of foreclosure in airline partnerships has been suggested by Chen and Gayle (2007), and 
Bilotkach (2007). Both papers model alliances with antitrust immunity and profit sharing. In either 
model, where an airline can choose from a variety of potential alliance partners, the airline not chosen 
alliances) are still awaiting their final decisions, two applications became dormant due to DOT’s dismissal, two became  
obsolete as the partnership ended before a decision was made, and one application was extended to the current SkyTeam 
investigation.  In  sum,  there  appears  to  be  only one  transatlantic  alliance  that  was  approved  subject  to  conditions  
(Lufthansa-SAS-United in 2002).
9  For more details on revenue sharing agreements within airline alliances, see Brueckner and Proost (2009).
10  With revenue sharing, partner airlines may split revenue not only from the interline, but also from the on-line (i.e.,  
single-airline) passengers.
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as a partner is unable to carry its passengers beyond its network. 
From the practical point of view, vertical foreclosure need not involve outright refusal to accept 
the interline passengers from anyone except the alliance partner.  What changes once the two airlines 
start cooperating is the ability to remove double marginalization for their interline services.  Antitrust 
immunity is  a  sufficient  (but  potentially not  a  necessary)  condition  for  such a  removal  of  double 
marginalization. Most studies of airline consolidation do not formally distinguish between alliances 
with  and  without  antitrust  immunity;  and  some  papers  (e.g.,  Bilotkach,  2005;  Bilotkach  and 
Hüschelrath,  2010) suggest  the  possibility for  the  alliance  without  antitrust  immunity to  yield  the 
removal of double marginalization. Yet, antitrust immunity allows explicit price coordination, and gives 
the partner airlines a possibility to either set up a joint venture with revenue sharing, or split the total  
interline fares  to  restrict  interlining outside of  their  network whenever  possible.  Reitzes  and Moss 
(2008) note that foreclosure will be more successful the higher the gateway’s reliance on connecting 
traffic, and the fewer the options for channeling passengers via alternative hub airports. They further 
suggest  that  the  current  structure  of  the  transatlantic  airline  industry  appears  more  conducive  to 
foreclosure at EU rather than US gateways, due to the relative dominance of EU countries’ flag carriers 
on the respective domestic markets.
The above-stated immediately suggests a simple hypothesis for detecting foreclosure following 
an  airline  partnership.  Namely,  foreclosure  will  entail  non-alliance  carriers  lowering  their  traffic 
from/into an alliance hub; while alliance members would increase this traffic. This point is illustrated in 
Figure 1, which breaks down non-stop transatlantic traffic at  Frankfurt  airport  (FRA) by operating 
carriers’ affiliation with the Star  Alliance partnerships  that  enjoy antitrust  immunity (the  United – 
Lufthansa partnership has been enjoying antitrust immunity since 1995).  We can clearly see that Star 
Alliance traffic has been increasing over the years, while transatlantic traffic by the airlines outside of 
Star Alliance has been declining or constant11.
11  Note that while Star Alliance membership has grown over the years, Star Alliance transatlantic services with antitrust 
immunity to/from Frankfurt airport have been performed by either Lufthansa or United. US Airways, while a member of 
Star Alliance, has not had antitrust immunity, and therefore its services are included into the “other airlines” category in  
Figure 2.
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Note: Computed from T-100 dataset (see data section of the paper).  LH = Lufthansa; UA = United; the two airlines have  
antitrust  immunity since 1996.  Services  to UA hubs include non-stop flights to Washington Dulles,  Chicago O’Hare,  
Denver, and San Francisco by United or Lufthansa.
Figure 1: Non-stop transatlantic passenger traffic at Frankfurt airport
Let us now examine which markets can be affected by foreclosure at hub airports of the immunized 
alliance members. Figure 2 depicts a simple network with two competing airline alliances.  Airports S1, 
H1, and H2 are located across the Atlantic Ocean from H3, H4, and S2.  Let us call the partnership 
between the airlines operating hubs H1 and H3 Alliance 1; while Alliance 2 members will operate hubs 
H2 and H4.  Then we can define the following types of international markets:
- Markets between the hubs within an Alliance: H1-H3 and H2-H4 routes;
- Markets between the hubs of competing Alliances: H1-H4 and H2-H3;
- Spoke-overseas hub routes: S1-H3, S1-H4, S2-H1, and S2-H2; note that in addition to one-stop 
flight possibilities, we may also have non-stop flights on these markets (not singled out here to 
keep Figure 3 as simple as possible).
- Spoke-spoke routes: S1-S2.
- Routes between alliance hubs and 'non-hub' markets, such as H3-X route on Figure 3. Note that 
the notion of 'non-hub' market is relative to the alliances with antitrust immunity. In fact, X 
could be a hub airport of an airline that does not belong to any of the alliances with immunity 
(e.g., X could denote Philadelphia airport, which is a hub for US Airways – a Star Alliance 
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member left out of the antitrust immunity deals).
Figure 2: Simple Network with Two Alliances
Let  us  analyze  the  possibility  of  market  foreclosure  on  the  above-defined  routes  due  to  antitrust 
immunity. 
– Markets between hubs of the same alliance (H1-H3 and H2-H4 routes) will see traffic gain by the 
corresponding alliance members. This is a typical result of removal of double marginalization that 
will  lower  S1-S2 fares  within  the  immunized  alliance.  At  the  same time,  airlines  that  are  not 
members of the alliance with immunity may see their traffic fall (example of such services include 
American Airlines' flights from Chicago to Frankfurt and Munich), as they are unable to channel 
their traffic outside of the hub airport of a carrier within an alliance with immunity.
– Markets between the hubs of competing Alliances (H1-H4 and H2-H3) could experience drop in 
non-stop traffic. Take H4, without loss of generality. Airlines within Alliance 2 will stop accepting 
H1-S2 traffic from Alliance 1. Does this actually mean the market is foreclosed for Alliance 1? No, 
because Alliance 1 will simply reroute its H1-S2 passengers via H3. Such rerouting can in practice 
make these services less attractive to consumers (e.g., a passenger traveling to Madrid from the 
USA would prefer a transfer in Paris to the one in Frankfurt, making United Airlines-Lufthansa 
option a less preferable alternative to the routing offered by Delta-Air France pair). However, if we 
take these routes as a group, we cannot really expect systematic foreclosure here.
– Spoke-overseas hub routes: S1-H3, S1-H4, S2-H1, and S2-H2. Consider the S1-H3 market.  In the 
extreme case, Alliance 2 may end up closing down the H2-H3 segment of its network (as it is 
unable to operate this market profitably without passengers connecting to spokes via H3).  Even if 
the segment is not closed down (so that alliance members only reduce frequency of service), the 
position of Alliance 2 on the S1-H3 route looks less favorable when compared to Alliance 1.
– Spoke-to-spoke markets (S1-S2) are not affected much by foreclosure, as competition between the 
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airlines is simply replaced by the competition between alliances. It is however true that the S1-S2 
passengers will now have fewer options, as routings S1-H1-H4-S2 and S1-H2-H3-S2 are no longer 
available to them.
– H3-X route (where alliance member competes with an airline that is not a member of an alliance 
with immunity) is the most important one to for our purposes. On this route, formation of alliance 
with immunity forecloses X-S2 market to the carrier that remains outside of an alliance, as it is no 
longer able to channel its traffic via H3.
The net effect of competition between the alliances is increased specialization of individual 
alliance members on channeling the passenger traffic via the alliance partners’ hubs, and reduction in 
traffic to the competing alliance’s hub airports.  While over the entire network the effect of this network 
reorganization  could  be  to  increase  the  number  of  markets  served,  and  competition  between  the 
alliances may intensify (especially on the spoke-to-spoke markets); we have identified some markets 
where competition will be decreased.  Specifically, those markets include  all  routes originating and 
terminating at the hub airport  of an immunized alliance member.  Our conclusion is actually quite 
different from the approach regulators have up to now applied to antitrust immunity, where only routes  
between  alliance  members’ hubs  have  been  considered  susceptible  to  reduced  competition  with 
antitrust immunity.  Last but not least, not all airlines are alliance members and the formation of airline 
alliances puts those carriers into a clearly disadvantageous position, also decreasing competition on the 
affected markets.  As an example, if we suppose that the H3-S2 route is also served by a non-alliance 
carrier, the formation of the alliance will decrease competition in this market.
In the end, we can formulate the following testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: airlines without antitrust immunity protection will serve fewer flights and carry fewer  
passengers (as compared to what they offer elsewhere on their network) on markets involving hub  
airports of members of alliances that enjoy antitrust immunity.  
Hypothesis 2: antitrust immunity is expected to yield lower traffic between the hub airports of members  
of competing alliances.
Hypothesis 3: antitrust immunity is expected to increase the corresponding airlines' services between  
their hubs 
Hypothesis 4: antitrust immunity is expected to increase the corresponding airlines' services from their  
hubs to airports that are not hubs of competing alliances.
Of the four hypotheses we formulated, only the first one is related to market foreclosure. Hypothesis 2 
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reflects re-routing of passengers on hub-spoke markets as a result of antitrust immunity. Hypotheses 3 
and 4 reflect expansion of the alliance with immunity due to removal of double marginalization and 
consolidation of traffic within the joint alliance network.
5.  Data
5.1 Sample and Key Variables
Our  main  data  source  is  the  T-100  dataset  for  international  airline  services,  provided  by the  US 
Department  of  Transportation.  This  dataset  includes  monthly information  on  all  non-stop  services 
between the USA and the rest  of the world.   Each entry contains information about the segment’s 
endpoints, operating carrier, and monthly totals for the number of departures performed, seats offered, 
and passengers carried on this particular segment.  From this dataset we have selected data for travel 
between the USA and all current EU members, plus Switzerland and Norway, for the years 1992 to 
2008.  We have retained only passenger services, yet eliminated services with fewer than ten monthly 
departures.12  Overall, we ended up with 51,896 observations, spanning 377 non-directional13 airport-
pair markets and 796 airline-market combinations between 38 US and 57 European airports.  
Our key independent variables will be types of airline services, defined according to both the 
airline’s membership in an alliance enjoying the antitrust immunity, and the endpoints’ status as a hub 
in one or the other airline’s network.  Specifically, we differentiate between:
- Immunized alliance members’ services between their respective hub airports (e.g., KLM flight 
from Amsterdam to Detroit); we will call those “Services between immunized hubs”
- Immunized alliance members’ services from their hub airports to a hub airport of a competing 
alliance with antitrust immunity (e.g., KLM service from Amsterdam to Chicago O’Hare after Star 
Alliance obtained antitrust immunity); to be denoted “Services between competitors’ hubs”
- Immunized alliance members’ services from their hub airports to airports which do not serve as 
hubs for any immunized alliance member (e.g., KLM service from Amsterdam to Boston); we will 
refer to those as “Other immunized alliance services”
- Services to immunized alliance members’ hub airports by airlines which are themselves not 
immunized alliance members (e.g., British Airways services to airports such as Chicago O’Hare, 
Denver, Washington Dulles, etc.).  This category will be called “Other services to alliance hubs”.
12  Since we defined markets as not directional, ten departures actually correspond to five flights each way, or about one 
scheduled flight per week.
13  This means that JFK-Heathrow traffic is lumped together with Heathrow-JFK passengers.
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Altogether, the above-defined four categories of markets represent all possible services to/from the hub 
airports of members of airline alliances with antitrust immunity. The baseline category will include all 
the services (by all the airlines) outside of the hub airports of the alliance members with immunity – 
i.e., services elsewhere on the network.
These four categories combined encompass (in 2008) up to 70 percent of all non-stop services 
in the dataset, as evident from Figure 3. That figure starts from 1996 rather than 1992, as 1996 is the  
first full year when we observe several competing alliances with antitrust immunity (KLM-Northwest 
partnership;  Delta–Swissair–Sabena–Austrian Airlines partnership;  as well  as  Lufthansa-United and 
Lufthansa-SAS immunity within Star Alliance).  It can be observed that between 1996 and 2002 there 
has been a steady growth in the share of services involving hubs of alliance partnerships with antitrust 
immunity; since then this share has stabilized at about 70 percent.  This implies that seven out of ten 
flights on the transatlantic markets (US-EU plus Norway and Switzerland) involve either one or two 
airports used as hubs by the airlines participating in partnerships with antitrust immunity14.
Note: Market shares are based on frequency of service; shares based on number of passengers carried and seats offered are  
similar.
Figure 3: Market Share of Services Involving Hubs of Alliances with Immunity
To correctly classify the services in line with the above categories, we need information on both the 
14 After 2010, with Continental-United merger, and granting of antitrust immunity to American Airlines – British Airways 
partnership, the total share of services involving at least one airport of an alliance member with immunity will exceed 85 
percent.
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airlines’ hub airports and the timeline of antitrust immunity decisions.  In addition, we know that some 
of  the  airline  partnerships  which  had  been  granted  antitrust  immunity  were  eventually  dissolved; 
therefore it was necessary to determine the corresponding timeline as well.  US DOT’s decisions on 
granting of antitrust immunity are publicly available; we used them to construct the timeline presented 
in the Appendix.  Internet research revealed the dates of dissolution of partnerships.  For the purpose of 
data analysis, we considered immunized alliances as operational starting from the month following the 
granting of antitrust immunity until either the month in which the partnership was dissolved or (for 
currently active alliances) the end of 2008.
Hub airports have been designated based on the structure of the airlines’ networks.  EU airlines’ 
hubs mostly corresponded to the respective countries’ capitals (except for Lufthansa, which operates 
hubs at both Frankfurt and Munich airports; Alitalia, using both Rome Fuimicino and Milan Malpensa 
as  hubs;  and  SAS,  operating  hubs  at  Copenhagen,  Stockholm,  and  Oslo).   For  the  US  airlines 
participating in airline partnerships with antitrust immunity, we have designated the following airports 
as hubs:
- American Airlines: Chicago O’Hare, Dallas Ft. Worth, Miami
- United Airlines: Chicago O’Hare, Denver, San Francisco, Washington D.C. (Dulles airport)
- Northwest Airlines: Detroit, Minneapolis, Memphis
- Delta Air Lines: Atlanta, Cincinnati, Salt Lake City,15 New York JFK
5.2 Control Variables
In the data analysis that follows, we will use the following control variables.  At the country level, we 
include data on the volume of trade between the USA and each of the European countries, as well as 
the information on whether there is a Visa Waiver Program16 in effect for a given European country, and 
whether there is an Open Skies Agreement17 in place.  All three – higher trade volume, Visa Waiver 
Program and Open Skies Agreement – are expected to yield higher travel volumes between the US and 
a  foreign  country.  However,  the  effect  of  each  of  these  variables  at  the  individual  route  level  is 
uncertain, as airlines may open up new routes to a country in response to each of these factors; and the 
15  There have been no transatlantic services out of Salt Lake City until 2008.
16  The Visa Waiver Program was introduced in 1986 and allows citizens of certain countries to visit the USA for tourism 
or business purposes for up to 90 days without a visa.  Of the current EU members, only Poland, Greece, Bulgaria,  
Romania, and Cyprus are not participating in this program.
17  Prior to the provisional opening of the Open Aviation Area to include US and EU (covering Switzerland and Norway as  
well), the US signed Open Skies Agreements with individual countries.  An Open Skies Agreement removes all barriers 
to entry with non-stop services between the US and a foreign country, except for the “nationality clause” (i.e., airlines 
operating such services had to be owned and effectively controlled by nationals of either of the two countries).
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travel volume on some ‘older’ routes may decline (e.g., if an airline starts serving Stuttgart in addition 
to Frankfurt, some passengers which used to fly to Frankfurt will now go to Stuttgart, so the passenger 
volume on flights to Frankfurt may decrease).
The market-level control variables include geometric averages of endpoints’ per capita income 
and population18; as well as the airport-pair market level Herfindahl index (we will use the index based 
on passenger volumes).
Airline indicator  variables will  be used where appropriate to control for the airline-specific 
effects.  Time-specific heterogeneity will be controlled for by year and month indicator variables.  The 
following Table includes descriptive statistics of our variables.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Monthly frequency 66.59 44.02 11.00 494.00
Monthly passengers 13,304.17 10,121.67 101.00 107,457.00
Monthly seats 17,713.43 12,828.48 392.00 145,576.00
Between immunized hubs 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Other immunized alliance 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Between competitors' hubs 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Other to alliance hubs 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
HHI 0.71 0.28 0.18 1.00
Visa Waiver Program 0.96 0.20 0.00 1.00
Trade volume (million US$) 53,539.63 35,645.67 399.6 152,001.00
Open Skies Agreement 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
It is clear from Table 1 that our dataset covers very heterogeneous transatlantic services: some involve 
mere hundreds passengers per month, while the largest players carry up to 3400 passengers daily on a 
single airport-pair market (equivalent to four roundtrips using fully loaded Boeing-747 aircraft in a 
conventional two-class configuration). On average, an airline in our sample performs one roundtrip per 
day, with the maximum of about six daily roundtrip services. An average service involves about 570 
seats offered per day (roughly equivalent to a Boeing-777 flying roundtrip), with about 75 percent load 
factor. Individual markets are rather concentrated, as far as non-stop services are concerned. About half 
of all the services are to countries, with which USA has an Open Skies Agreement. For the entire  
sample, half of the observations fall into one of the four categories we have defined previously. That is,  
overall  half  of the services involve at  least  one hub airport  of a member of alliance with antitrust 
immunity. Recall from Figure 3, however, that closer to the end of the time period this paper covers,  
about 7 in 10 transatlantic flights involve at least one such hub airports.
18 For EU countries, only country-level data on per capita income was available. For US endpoints, MSA level data was 
used.
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6.  Data Analysis and Results
6.1 Methodology
Our main hypothesis  is  that  members  of airline partnerships with antitrust  immunity will  have an 
incentive  to  block  feeder  traffic  from the  airlines  that  are  not  part  of  their  alliance.  This  can  be 
operationalized via direct refusal, increased interlining fees for accepting passengers of outside airlines, 
and/or  attracting  passengers  from within  the  alliance  due  to  price  coordination  authorized  by the 
antitrust immunity. In either case, we deal with foreclosure of markets beyond the alliance members’ 
hub airports to competitors.
We will estimate the following specification:
log Y ij=X ij 1 I HubHub
Immunity2 I HubOtherHub
Immunity 3 I HubOther
Immunity 4 I ToImmnuneHub
No−Immunity ij
Where:
– Y is either flight frequency, or number of passengers carried by airline i on market j;
– X is the vector of various control variables;
– I HubHub
Immunity represents the dummy variable for services between the alliance members' hubs by the 
members of alliance with antitrust immunity (e.g., Delta Air Lines and Air France flights between 
Paris and Atlanta, after the carriers obtained immunity for their partnership);
– I HubOtherHub
Immunity is  the  indicator  variable  for  services  between the  competing  alliances'  hubs  (e.g., 
Delta  Air  Lines  service  to  Frankfurt  when  both  Delta  and  Lufthansa  are  in  an  alliance  with 
immunity);
– I HubOther
Immunity is the dummy for services by the members of an alliance with immunity to other airports 
than the hubs of same or competing alliances with antitrust immunity (e.g., Lufthansa flights from 
Frankfurt to such airports as Phoenix, Boston, Dallas-Ft. Worth, or Seattle);
– I ToImmuneHub
No−Immunity dummy  represents  services  by  the  airlines  not  included  into  partnerships  with 
immunity (such as Continental Airlines or US Airways' services to the respective EU hubs, such as 
Paris, Amsterdam, or Frankfurt), as well as – admittedly infrequent – flights by competing alliance 
members from airports  other  than their  hubs,  to hub airports  of alliance partners with antitrust 
immunity (e.g.,  United  Airlines'  New York-Amsterdam service).  It  pays  to  note  here  that  this 
category  includes  services  by  partner  airlines  within  the  same  alliance,  but  without  antitrust 
immunity (for  instance,  US Airways  has  been in  Star  Alliance  for  a  while,  but  did not  enjoy 
antitrust immunity). This potentially biases the results against us, as partner airlines with immunity 
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might not have an incentive to foreclose the markets to their partners without immunity.
The outside category includes services by the airlines that are not part of the alliances with antitrust  
immunity, which do not involve any of the hub airports of the airlines which do enjoy such immunity 
within their partnerships. Such services include many of the flights to/from UK (e.g., British Airways' 
flights to Philadelphia, Seattle, Los Angeles, Phoenix; American Airlines' flights to London from Los 
Angeles, Miami, Dallas-Ft.Worth, St. Louis; United Airlines' flights to London from New York), and a 
lot of the flights by the airlines that do not participate in partnerships with antitrust immunity, such as 
Continental Airlines and US Airways.
As we discussed previously,  foreclosure will  show itself  via  lower frequency of service and  
passenger volumes, offered by the outside carriers to hub airports of members of the alliance with  
antitrust immunity. In terms of the specification above, the research hypothesis is that 40 . This  
will be the main contention tested in our data analysis.
Other hypotheses consistent with removal of double marginalization by antitrust immunity – 
and corresponding increase in traffic – would be 10  and 30 . We also discussed that routes 
between the competing alliance members' hubs might be affected by antitrust immunity, which may 
manifest itself in reduced traffic; however, we also noted that it is not entirely correct to attribute any 
such traffic reduction to vertical market foreclosure. A priori, however, we expect that 20 .
One econometric challenge we face is market, airline, and airline-market specific heterogeneity, 
compounded  by the  fact  that  many carriers  in  our  sample  operate  hub-and-spoke  networks.  This 
network structure implies, among other things, that flight frequency decisions, especially on spoke-hub 
routes, are driven not by spoke-hub demand, but by demand on various spoke-spoke markets, going 
through the hub. To deal with this problem, we follow Bilotkach (2011), and estimate airline-airport-
pair-market fixed-effects model.
In the airline-market fixed effect model, the effects we are interested in will be identified by the 
variation in the relevant variable within a given airline-market cross-section.  As an example, consider 
Delta Air Lines’ service from Atlanta to Vienna.  This service will be classified in the outside category 
before antitrust immunity was granted to the Delta – Austrian partnership (from January 1992 till June 
1996); as well as after the partnership ended and before the Austrian – United pair obtained antitrust 
immunity within Star Alliance (April 2000 to January 2001).  After Delta – Austrian obtained antitrust 
immunity and before their partnership ended (July 1996 to March 2000), this service will be classified 
as  service between immunized hubs.  In the period from February 2001 until January 2002, Austrian 
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was a member of a partnership with antitrust immunity, while Delta was not: this implies that Delta 
service from Atlanta to Vienna will be in the other service to alliance hubs category during this period. 
In January 2002 Delta Air Lines itself became a part of an alliance with antitrust immunity.  From 
February 2002 until the end of 2008 (as far as our dataset spans) Delta’s Atlanta – Vienna service will 
be in the  service between competitors’ hubs category.  Overall, about one third of all airline-market 
combinations in our sample move between the above-described categories at least once (the share is  
higher if we restrict our sample to services of ‘legacy’ carriers – see below for a relevant description).
To address the potential  autocorrelation issue, we can estimate a dynamic panel data model 
where the lagged dependent variable is introduced as a right-hand side regressor. Yet, dynamic panel 
data models can result in biased coefficient estimates due to the obvious endogeneity in the lagged 
dependent variable. In order to address this endogeneity threat, we will employ the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimator for dynamic panel data. Specifically, we will use the system estimator 
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) which built and improved upon the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
GMM estimator. System GMM analysis is specifically designed to address endogeneity issues with 
dynamic panel data models (i.e., biases in the coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable). 
The model we report includes two lags of the respective dependent variable on the right-hand side, and 
third to sixth lags are used as instruments. We employ the following specifications. In all cases, first 
and second lags of the respective dependent variable is used. These are instrumented with third and 
fourth lags in regressions for the entire sample; and third to sixth lags in all other sub-samples. These 
specifications were chosen as they satisfy both of the fundamental conditions for the system GMM 
estimator:  no  correlation  between  the  instruments  and  the  residuals  (Hansen  J  test),  and  no 
autocorrelation in the residuals (Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation).
In addition to running regressions on the entire sample; we will perform a series of robustness 
checks for our results.  First, we will restrict our sample to services performed by the ‘legacy’ carriers; 
these include EU countries’ traditional flag carriers and major US airlines.  In this way, we eliminate 
services by smaller and charter carriers, as well as by the airlines from other parts of the world (mostly 
Asian  carriers)  performing  transatlantic  services  under  the  fifth  freedom rights19.   This  restriction 
decreased the number of observations by about twelve percent.  Second, we exclude services to/from 
the United Kingdom – by far the largest transatlantic market (at the country level).  This country’s flag 
19  Fifth freedom rights allow the airline to carry revenue passengers between foreign countries as part  of the service 
to/from its own country (e.g., under the fifth freedom right Air India is allowed to carry London-New York passengers 
on the respective segment of its New Delhi–London–New York service).
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carrier (British Airways) has faced a number of obstacles in trying to obtain antitrust immunity for its 
partnership with American Airlines, and travel between the US and the UK has been subject to some 
idiosyncratic rules, most notably entry restrictions at London Heathrow airport20.  Third, to make sure 
the airlines’ potentially non-random entry and exit decisions do not bias our results, we restricted our 
sample to services observed in at least 190 out of 204 possible months.  This restriction constrained us 
to working with 93 airline-market combinations.
6.2 Results
Results of our data analysis exercise are presented in Tables 2 through 4. Table 2 is essentially the main  
output  table,  with  results  for  the  entire  sample,  and robustness  checks  that  include  excluding UK 
services, and limiting sample to the legacy carriers. Table 3 reports results for the sub-sample including 
‘steady’ services (i.e., those observed in at least 190 out of 204 possible months).  Table 4 reports the 
Arellano – Bover dynamic panel GMM estimation results.
The estimation results are consistent with the market foreclosure hypothesis, and are robust to 
excluding non-legacy carrier services, services to/from the United Kingdom, and ‘sporadic’ services. 
Fixed  effects  estimation  suggests  antitrust  immunity  leads  to  a  2.5  to  6  percent  decrease  in  the 
frequency of service by the outside carriers serving the newly immunized hub. Specifically, size of the 
effect for the entire sample is 2.5 percent, and up to 3 percent when UK services are excluded (see 
Table  2).  When  only  steady  services  are  taken  into  account,  the  effect  of  market  foreclosure  on 
frequency of service doubles to 4.5-6 percent (see Table 3). The effect on the passenger volumes is 
generally 1.5 to 2 times the effect on frequency (roughly 5-6 percent in Table 2, and 7-8.5 percent in 
Table 3), suggesting excluded airlines switch to a smaller aircraft and/or end up with lower load factors 
on their services to the newly immunized hubs.  
GMM estimation results, reported in Table 4, indicate an effect of a smaller magnitude (0.7 to 
1.5  percent  for  frequency,  and  2.6  to  3.5  percent  for  passenger  volume),  with  ratio  between  the 
frequency and passenger  volume effects  of  2.2  to  larger  than  3.  GMM estimation  thus  finds  that 
suspected effects of market foreclosure on passenger volumes are much more pronounced than same on 
frequency of service.
Our results for the entire sample imply the following mean effects of market foreclosure due to 
antitrust immunity. Results in Table 2 suggest that after granting of the antitrust immunity,  airlines 
flying to the hub of the respective alliance member will operate about 1.7 fewer monthly flights, and 
20  Up to May 2008, two US (American and United) and two UK (British Airways and Virgin Atlantic) airlines were  
allowed to perform direct transatlantic services out of this airport.
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carry about 650 fewer passengers per month. The corresponding magnitudes implied by system GMM 
estimates are much smaller: 0.5 fewer flights and 355 fewer passengers. Interestingly, our results also 
suggest that traffic lost by the carrier outside of the partnership with antitrust immunity is replaced by 
the  hub  operator  with  antitrust  immunity  (one  can  see  it  by  comparing  the  magnitudes  of  the 
coefficients on “other services to immunized hubs“ and “other immunized alliance services” variables).
Results for effect of antitrust immunity on services by the corresponding partner airlines out of 
their hub airports to hub airports of their own alliance partners and to non-hub airports are well in 
accordance with our expectations. Antitrust immunity leads to a staggering increase in passenger traffic 
between the partner airlines' hub airports (from 14 percent in GMM estimation to 25 percent in fixed 
effects  regressions).  Obtaining  antitrust  immunity  also  helps  the  corresponding  carriers  to  add 
passengers on flights to other airports from their hubs. Size of this effect varies between 2 (GMM) and 
nearly 5 (fixed effects) percent.
We  expected  antitrust  immunity  to  lead  to  lower  traffic  between  competing  alliances'  hub 
airports. In this dimension, results have not been consistent across specifications. The expected effect 
shows robustly only in Table 3 (results for 'steady' services); elsewhere, the corresponding coefficient is 
either positive or not statistically significant. But then, we concluded earlier that expected decrease in 
traffic  between  hubs  of  competing  alliances  with  antitrust  immunity  is  not  really  evidence  of 
foreclosure.
The results reported in Table 5 indicate that the foreclosure manifest itself in the airlines’ load 
factors rather than the carriers’ choice of aircraft size. This is understandable, as the carriers effectively 
face a lower bound on the size of aircraft which can be used for transatlantic services – one cannot fly 
those routes using aircrafts smaller than Boeing-757 or 767, seating about 200 – 250 passengers.
Some of  the control  variables exhibit  surprising behavior.   Most strikingly,  the relationship 
between  market  concentration  and  frequency/passenger  volumes  is  positive.   This  contradicts  the 
findings of other recent research (e.g., Pai, 2010; Bilotkach, 2011; Bilotkach et al., 2010).  However, 
those other studies use different datasets, and examine airlines’ frequency choices in the  unregulated 
airline industry; in our case, entry restrictions are present, at least in the form of the nationality clauses, 
and  these  constraints  could  be  driving  the  frequency-concentration  relationship  we  discovered. 
Negative effects of population and trade volume in some specifications are most probably driven by the 
airlines’ hub-and-spoke networks.  Open skies  agreements  sometimes imply a  negligible  or  even a 
negative effect on frequency; but the effect of market liberalization on the passenger volumes is clearly 
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positive.
6.3 Discussion
Our data analysis showed that airlines excluded from the partnerships with antitrust immunity end up 
decreasing their frequency of service, and experience lower passenger traffic volumes (mostly due to a 
lower load factor rather than the use of smaller aircraft) for their services to the immunized alliance 
members’ hub airports.  This is consistent with the market foreclosure hypothesis we postulated.  This 
subsection  addresses  the  question  of  whether  the  foreclosure  which  we  detected  is  pro-  or  anti-
competitive.
Before we proceed, several points need to be stressed.  First, we do not study the price effects of 
antitrust immunity. This mainly has to do with the fact that complete and reliable price data for this 
market is not available – publicly available datasets only include information on pricing by the US 
carriers and partnerships including US airlines21).  Thus, all claims we are making in this subsection 
will be based on results for passenger traffic volumes, and can sometimes be interpreted differently 
depending on what one believes about the nature of competition in the commercial passenger airline 
industry.  Second, the transatlantic airline market had for some time exhibited competition between 
several airline partnerships with antitrust immunity – this will also influence the interpretation of our 
findings.  Third, in our discussion of foreclosure effects we will ignore any possible effects of services 
having more stops than the ones under consideration.
Recall from our earlier discussion that several types of international markets can be defined 
relative to the structure of partner airline’s networks.  Specifically, we will evaluate the implications of 
our results for the following categories of markets:
− Markets  for  travel  between  the  immunized  alliance  members’  hubs  (e.g,  Amsterdam  - 
Minneapolis);
− Markets for travel between the competing alliance members’ hub airports (e.g., Amsterdam – 
Chicago);
− Markets for travel from an immunized alliance member’s hub airport to non-hub airports (e.g., 
Frankfurt – Boston);
− Beyond-the-gateway to alliance member’s hub airport market (e.g., Tucson to Amsterdam);
− Beyond-the-gateway to beyond-the-gateway markets (e.g., Tucson to Turin).
Let us consider these market categories one by one.
21  Thus, available data are most suitable for studying price effects of airline partnerships on the beyond-the-gateway routes 
(e.g., Brueckner, 2003)
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Routes between alliance members’ hub airports
Previous literature identified these markets as the most likely candidates for abuse of market power by 
partner airlines as the existence of a partnership (especially the one backed by antitrust immunity) leads 
to reduced competition on those routes.  There is however little support for this claim in the empirical  
literature.   We  observe  that  antitrust  immunity  leads  to  higher  frequency  of  service  and  higher 
passenger volumes on those markets.  Of course, most of the additional passengers on Amsterdam-
Minneapolis flights do not travel from Amsterdam to Minneapolis, but use this flight as a segment in 
their  journey.   At  the  same time,  Minneapolis  –  Amsterdam customers  benefit  from the increased 
frequency of  service  and the  consequent  decrease in  the total  price of  travel;  not  to  mention that 
antitrust immunity can be responsible for the very existence of non-stop services between the partners’ 
hub airports22. 
Routes between competitors’ hub airports
On these routes we suspected antitrust immunity to lead to a decline in the frequency and/or passenger 
volumes.  We did not find robust support for our contention in the data.  However, the results of the  
data analysis for the sub-samples of ‘steady’ services do point to a 5-6 percent decline in passenger 
volumes on such routes. That is, traffic can fall following antitrust immunity, as competing airlines 
reroute their passengers via respective hubs within alliances.
Routes from immunized alliance members to non-hub airports
Our data analysis suggests that we observe strengthening market power on these routes by the airlines 
included in partnerships with antitrust immunity, as their passenger volume increases, and that of the 
excluded carriers declines.  On duopoly markets falling in this category (we rarely see competition by 
more than two airlines on these routes), our regression coefficients suggest a zero to slightly negative 
net effects for antitrust immunity on passenger volumes.  The airline with a membership in an alliance 
with antitrust  immunity obtains  an advantage over its  excluded competitor.   The net  effect of this 
development  on  prices  will  crucially  depend  on  the  nature  of  competition  between  the  carriers. 
Overall, we can conclude that foreclosure may yield anti-competitive outcomes on these markets.
Beyond-the-gateway to alliance member’s hub airport routes
Passengers on those routes are  required to make one transfer before (or after)  crossing the ocean. 
Antitrust immunity leads to a clearly dominant position of the partnership whose member operates hub 
airports across the ocean.  For instance, Skyteam alliance will obtain a dominant position on the Tucson 
22  As an example, Austrian operated non-stop flights to Atlanta only while it had antitrust immunity for its partnership 
with Delta.
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to Amsterdam market.  This is yet another category of markets where our data analysis results suggest a 
potential for anticompetitive effects of antitrust immunity.
Beyond-the-gateway to beyond-the-gateway routes
Passengers  on  these  routes  are  probably  the  biggest  winners  from antitrust  immunity,  as  actually 
suggested by Kasper and Lee (2009).  When traveling within an alliance, passengers on those markets 
invariably use the route between the alliance members’ hubs as a segment in their journey.  A higher 
frequency of service on the route between the hubs means, other things equal, that antitrust immunity 
will allow partner airlines to connect more beyond-the-gateway endpoints on both sides of the ocean 
with their services.  The existence of several such airline partnerships ensures at least some degree of 
competition for passengers on those routes.
Overall,  our results suggest that bringing the possibility of market foreclosure as a result of 
antitrust immunity into consideration allows us to point to the possibility of anti-competitive effects on 
markets, which have generally been considered immune to lower competition as a result of increased 
airline  cooperation.  For  instance,  it  has  been  believed  that  airline  alliances  should  not  affect 
competition on routes from alliance members’ hub airports to non-hub gateways. We show that this 
might not be true, and suggest that competition on all markets involving hub airport of a member of an  
alliance with antitrust immunity can decrease through market foreclosure.
7.  Conclusion
The theoretical literature has suggested that members of international airline partnerships might have 
an incentive to foreclose the beyond-the-gateway markets to the airlines excluded from the respective 
alliance.  It has also been suggested that such foreclosure will likely be most effective when alliance 
partners have the right to jointly set fares for the interline services, and engage in revenue sharing 
arrangements – a privilege otherwise known as antitrust immunity.  This paper analyzes and quantifies 
effects of such market foreclosure.
We conduct an extensive analysis of the data on non-stop services on the transatlantic scheduled 
commercial passenger airline market.  Merging the data with the information on the structure of the 
airlines’ networks and dynamics of the airline partnerships on the same market over the time period 
from 1992 to 2008, we are able to analyze whether the airlines enjoying antitrust immunity take steps  
to exclude interline passengers arriving on the rival carriers’ flights.  We find that antitrust immunity 
leads  to  a  2.5–6  percent  (0.7–1.5  percent  in  dynamic  panel  data  GMM  estimation)  decrease  in 
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frequency of service by the non-alliance carriers serving a newly immunized hub.  The effect on the 
passenger volumes is even greater (4.8 to 8.5 percent drop in fixed effects, 2.6 to 3.5 percent in GMM; 
and generally 1.5 to 2 times the effect on frequency).  This suggests excluded airlines switch to smaller 
aircraft and/or end up with lower load factors on their services to the newly immunized hubs.
Based on our results, we suggest that antitrust immunity may lead to reduced competition on all 
markets (whether non-stop or one-stop) involving alliance members’ hub airport(s). In particular, where 
an immunized alliance member competes with a non-alliance carrier, foreclosure following antitrust 
immunity results in increased market share inequality and potentially lower total traffic.  Note that the 
literature has up to now only considered markets for travel between alliance members’ hub airports as 
candidates  for  lower  competition  following  antitrust  immunity.   We effectively expand  the  set  of 
markets where antitrust immunity may yield losses to the traveling public.
More generally, our study presents evidence which is somewhat contrary to what is found in the 
general empirical literature on market foreclosure.  Most studies suggest that foreclosure appears to be 
pro-competitive; we suppose that the competitive effects of market foreclosure might depend on market 
characteristics.   Admittedly,  we are unable  to  analyze  the price  effects  of  market  foreclosure,  and 
antitrust immunity may bring about cost synergies which will be passed along to travelers in the form 
of lower airfares, offsetting the negative effects we detect.  However, available data does not allow 
conducting a detailed welfare analysis and lower passenger volumes at the market level are generally 
not consistent with potentially lower fares.
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Table 2: Main Results
Independent Variable
Logarithm of frequency is dependent variable Logarithm of total passengers is dependent variable
Entire sample Legacy carriers only
Excluding 
UK
Exclude UK, 
legacy only Entire sample
Legacy 
carriers only
Excluding 
UK
Exclude UK, 
legacy only
Constant 2.7718**(0.0654)
2.8987**
(0.0708)
3.6226**
(0.0941)
3.7700**
(0.1018)
7.7791**
(0.0785)
7.8671**
(0.0838)
8.3763**
(0.0930)
8.5213**
(0.0981)
HHI 0.0948**(0.01268)
0.1178**
(0.0108)
0.1017**
(0.0127)
1.20E-01**
(0.0117)
0.1109**
(0.0128)
0.1499**
(0.0107)
0.1102**
(0.0126)
0.1436**
(0.0123)
Average population 1.31E-07**(1.23E-08)
1.45E-07**
(1.29E-08)
-1.20E-07**
(2.28E-08)
-1.26E-07**
(2.40E-08)
5.18E-08**
(1.50E-08)
5.25E-08**
(1.62E-08)
-1.43E-07**
(2.16E-08)
-1.75E-07**
(2.35E-08)
Average per capita income 1.28E-05**(1.32E-06)
9.16E-06**
(1.24E-06)
6.33E-06**
(1.48E-06)
4.58E-06**
(1.54E-06)
2.28E-05**
(1.41E-06)
2.04E-05**
(1.43E-06)
1.56E-05**
(1.54E-06)
1.49E-05**
(1.62E-06)
Between immunized 
hubs
0.1289**
(0.0089)
0.1246**
(0.0087)
0.1403**
(0.0093)
0.1411**
(0.0091)
0.2536**
(0.0120)
0.2405**
(0.0122)
0.2550**
(0.0127)
0.2468**
(0.0136)
Other immunized 
alliance services
0.0111**
(0.0055)
0.0052
(0.0057)
0.0252**
(0.0065)
0.0259**
(0.0066)
0.0423**
(0.0064)
0.0279**
(0.0065)
0.0487**
(0.0070)
0.0402**
(0.0070)
Between competitors’ 
hubs
0.0130
(0.0099)
0.0081
(0.0098)
0.0319**
(0.0097)
0.0346**
(0.0095)
0.0105
(0.0113)
-0.0069
(0.0105)
0.0100
(0.0112)
-0.0003
(0.0103)
Other services to 
immunized hubs
-0.0259**
(0.0059)
-0.0277**
(0.0075)
-0.0293**
(0.0061)
-0.0298**
(0.0077)
-0.0486**
(0.0074)
-0.0511**
(0.0079)
-0.0614**
(0.0083)
-0.0596**
(0.0088)
Trade volume -2.85E-07**(1.33E-07)
-8.42E-08
(1.23E-07)
-6.39E-07**
(1.54E-07)
-8.04E-07**
(1.51E-07)
-1.20E-06**
(1.70E-07)
-1.04E-06**
(1.85E-07)
-1.39E-06**
(1.72E-07)
-1.55E-06**
(1.86E-07)
Visa waiver 0.1960**(0.0206)
0.1819**
(0.0207)
0.1790**
(0.0202)
0.1661**
(0.0202)
0.1741**
(0.0253)
0.1718**
(0.0244)
0.1468**
(0.0245)
0.1469**
(0.0234)
Open skies agreement -0.0169**(0.0058)
-0.0056
(0.0058)
-0.0035
(0.0073)
0.0150**
(0.0068)
0.0326**
(0.0054)
0.0395**
(0.0053)
0.0615**
(0.0070)
0.0705**
(0.0068)
# of Observations 51896 45923 37353 33242 51896 45923 37353 33242
Adjusted R-squared 0.81406 0.75943 0.76892 0.68249 0.83522 0.80975 0.80397 0.76148
Notes:
1. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses
2. Year and month dummies included in all regressions, but not reported
3. Significance: ** -  5%; * - 10%
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Table 3: Results for ‘steady’ services
Independent Variable
Logarithm of frequency is dependent variable Logarithm of total passengers is dependent variable
Entire sample Legacy carriers only
Excluding 
UK
Exclude UK, 
legacy only Entire sample
Legacy 
carriers only
Excluding 
UK
Exclude UK, 
legacy only
Constant 1.9367**(0.0707)
1.8163**
(0.0728)
1.6271**
(0.0982)
1.7221**
(0.1008)
7.0183**
(0.0926)
6.8522**
(0.0959)
6.5029**
(0.1185)
6.5661**
(0.1145)
HHI 0.0737**(0.0116)
0.0667**
(0.0117)
0.0804**
(0.0121)
0.0738**
(0.0124)
0.1020**
(0.0139)
0.0972**
(0.0139)
0.1087**
(0.0155)
0.1055**
(0.0156)
Average population 3.00E-07**(1.03E-08)
3.37E-07**
(1.09E-08)
4.33E-07**
(1.90E-08)
4.20E-07**
(1.97E-08)
2.24E-07**
(1.40E-08)
2.67E-07**
(1.49E-08)
3.70E-07**
(2.15E-08)
3.61E-07**
(2.11E-08)
Average per capita income 2.08E-05**(8.94E-07)
2.14E-05**
(8.92E-07)
2.39E-05**
(1.39E-06)
2.29E-05**
(1.40E-06)
3.35E-05**
(1.20E-06)
3.46E-05**
(1.20E-06)
3.57E-05**
(1.70E-06)
3.50E-05**
(1.64E-06)
Between immunized 
hubs
0.1484**
(0.0112)
0.1541**
(0.0115)
0.1730**
(0.0145)
0.1823**
(0.0152)
0.2211**
(0.0116)
0.2244**
(0.0119)
0.2300**
(0.0138)
0.2352**
(0.0146)
Other immunized 
alliance services
0.0040
(0.0064)
0.0022
(0.0064)
0.0182**
(0.0073)
0.0239**
(0.0073)
0.0333**
(0.0074)
0.0295**
(0.0073)
0.0404**
(0.0084)
0.0432**
(0.0084)
Between competitors’ 
hubs
-0.0743**
(0.0096)
-0.0717**
(0.0096)
-0.0469**
(0.0117)
-0.0388**
(0.0122)
-0.0604**
(0.0115)
-0.0610**
(0.0115)
-0.0575**
(0.0125)
-0.0543**
(0.0130)
Other services to 
immunized hubs
-0.0462**
(0.0084)
-0.0612**
(0.0090)
-0.0445**
(0.0115)
-0.0555**
(0.0119)
-0.0691**
(0.0078)
-0.0857**
(0.0083)
-0.0694**
(0.0119)
-0.0825**
(0.0126)
Trade volume 1.12E-06**(1.43E-07)
1.05E-06**
(1.42E-07)
1.21E-06**
(1.74E-07)
1.01E-06**
(1.83E-07)
-1.22E-06**
(1.63E-07)
-1.25E-06**
(1.66E-07)
-9.60E-07**
(1.62E-07)
-1.09E-06**
(1.65E-07)
Visa waiver 0.3435**(0.0342)
0.3502**
(0.0344)
0.3782**
(0.0349)
0.3758**
(0.0349)
0.3263**
(0.0312)
0.3347**
(0.0314)
0.3498**
(0.0322)
0.3493**
(0.0321)
Open skies agreement 0.0132*(0.0073)
0.0091
(0.0076)
0.0476**
(0.0103)
0.0433**
(0.0104)
0.0496**
(0.0087)
0.0465**
(0.0089)
0.0831**
(0.0108)
0.0790**
(0.0110)
# of Observations 18862 18461 11791 11593 18862 18461 11791 11593
Adjusted R-squared 0.8028 0.79314 0.66465 0.66237 0.84585 0.84353 0.78110 0.78439
Notes:
1. Sample includes only those airline-market cross-sections, which appear in the data at least for 190 months (out of 204 maximum possible)
2. Number of cross-sections: entire sample – 93; legacy carriers only – 91; exclude UK – 58; legacy carriers and excluding UK – 57.
3. Model employed – airline – market fixed effects.
4. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses.
5. Year and month dummies included in all regressions, but not reported.
6. Significance: ** -  5%; * - 10%
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Table 4: Dynamic panel data GMM model results
Independent Variable
Logarithm of frequency is dependent variable Logarithm of total passengers is dependent variable
Entire sample Legacy carriers only
Excluding 
UK
Exclude UK, 
legacy only Entire sample
Legacy 
carriers only
Excluding 
UK
Exclude UK, 
legacy only
Lagged Dependent 0.3695**(0.0007)
0.3715**
(0.0008)
0.3764**
(0.0010)
0.3819**
(0.0007)
0.2998**
(0.0011)
0.2987**
(0.0011)
0.3041**
(0.0009)
0.3111**
(0.0009)
Twice Lagged Dependent 0.1583**(0.0004)
0.1523**
(0.0004)
0.1507**
(0.0005)
0.1485**
(0.0004)
0.0983**
(0.0005)
0.1009**
(0.0002)
0.0975**
(0.0003)
0.0969**
(0.0003)
HHI 0.0420**(0.0018)
0.0639**
(0.00146)
0.0549**
(0.0020)
0.0723**
(0.0011)
0.0645**
(0.0031)
0.0889**
(0.0017)
0.0606**
(0.0028)
0.0873**
(0.0018)
Average population 6.81E-08**(2.12E-09)
8.31E-08**
(1.48E-09)
-5.88E-08**
(4.61E-09)
-6.61E-08**
(3.56E-09)
4.14E-08**
(3.61E-09)
4.00E-08**
(1.29E-09)
-7.26E-08**
(6.63E-09)
-9.46E-08**
(5.13E-09)
Average per capita income 6.54E-06**(3.45E-07)
5.43E-06**
(2.47E-07)
3.45E-06**
(3.48E-07)
3.16E-06**
(2.36E-07)
1.42E-05**
(5.99E-07)
1.24E-05**
(2.74E-07)
9.70E-06**
(5.15E-07)
8.72E-06**
(4.26E-07)
Between immunized 
hubs
0.0665**
(0.0034)
0.0691**
(0.0022)
0.0805**
(0.0025)
0.0840**
(0.0019)
0.1453**
(0.0054)
0.1358**
(0.0023)
0.1405**
(0.0034)
0.1382**
(0.0017)
Other immunized 
alliance services
0.0093**
(0.0014)
0.0062**
(0.0008)
0.0188**
(0.0011)
0.0187**
(0.0008)
0.0295**
(0.0016)
0.0197**
(0.0007)
0.0312**
(0.0016)
0.0272**
(0.0012)
Between competitors’ 
hubs
0.0137**
(0.0018)
0.0100**
(0.0014)
0.0238**
(0.0020)
0.0254**
(0.0012)
0.0139**
(0.0033)
-0.0002
(0.0018)
0.0092**
(0.0022)
0.0036**
(0.0014)
Other services to 
immunized hubs
-0.0076**
(0.0014)
-0.0109**
(0.0010)
-0.0118**
(0.0012)
-0.0151**
(0.0010)
-0.0295**
(0.0019)
-0.0284**
(0.0012)
-0.0355**
(0.0018)
-0.0340**
(0.0012)
Trade volume -6.33E-08(5.26E-08)
1.36E-08
(2.93E-08)
-2.45E-07**
(3.42E-08)
-4.23E-07**
(3.04E-08)
-5.02E-07**
(6.61E-08)
-4.72E-07**
(3.67E-08)
-6.53E-07**
(5.65E-08)
-7.55E-07**
(3.61E-08)
Visa waiver 0.0976**(0.0031)
0.0967**
(0.00204)
0.0946**
(0.0022)
0.0947**
(0.0016)
0.1098**
(0.0092)
0.1089**
(0.0051)
0.0882**
(0.0042)
0.0944**
(0.0039)
Open skies agreement -0.0087**(0.0010)
-0.0016*
(0.0009)
-0.0011
(0.0014)
0.0093**
(0.0010)
0.0221**
(0.0019)
0.0226**
(0.0012)
0.0344**
(0.0019)
0.0429**
(0.0014)
# of Observations 47610 42838 34354 30954 47610 42838 34354 30954
P-value of Hansen J 
statistic 0.52 0.2802 0.8484 0.9836 0.48 0.1192 0.7180 0.9892
P-value of Arellano-Bond 
test for serial correlation 0.26 0.45 0.54 0.37 0.22 0.53 0.44 0.48
Notes: Model employed – dynamic panel data GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with airline-market fixed effects. Year and month fixed effects included in all 
regressions, but not reported. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance: ** -  5%; * - 10%
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Table 5: Effects on aircraft size and load factors
(a) Airline-market fixed effects
Specification Between immunized hubs
Other immunized 
alliance services
Between 
competitors’ hubs
Other services to 
immunized hubs
Dependent 
variable – 
logarithm of 
aircraft size
Entire sample 0.0089(0.0056)
0.0159**
(0.0031)
-0.0346**
(0.0052)
-0.0066**
(0.0034)
Legacy carriers 
only
0.0082
(0.0055)
0.0141**
(0.0031)
-0.0359**
(0.0052)
-0.0011
(0.0041)
Excluding UK 0.0053(0.0057)
0.0018
(0.0038)
-0.0432**
(0.0059)
-0.0057
(0.0042)
Excluding UK, 
legacy only
0.0044
(0.0057)
-0.0011
(0.0039)
-0.0450**
(0.0059)
0.0002
(0.0051)
Dependent 
variable – 
logarithm of 
load factor
Entire sample 0.1247**(0.0124)
0.0311**
(0.0040)
-0.0024
(0.0066)
-0.0227**
(0.0049)
Legacy carriers 
only
0.1158**
(0.0128)
0.0226**
(0.0040)
-0.0151**
(0.0065)
-0.0234**
(0.0053)
Excluding UK 0.1146**(0.0126)
0.0235**
(0.0046)
-0.0219**
(0.0067)
-0.0320**
(0.0055)
Excluding UK, 
legacy only
0.1056**
(0.0135)
0.0143**
(0.0049)
-0.0349**
(0.0069)
-0.0298**
(0.0061)
Notes:
1. All dependent variables, specifications, and sample sizes are identical to those reported in Table 2
2. Adjusted R-squared and coefficients on control variables are similar to those reported in Table 2
3. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses
4. Significance: ** -  5%; * - 10%
(b) Dynamic panel data GMM
Specification Between immunized hubs
Other immunized 
alliance services
Between 
competitors’ hubs
Other services to 
immunized hubs
Dependent 
variable – 
logarithm of 
aircraft size
Entire sample 0.0012*(0.0007)
0.0058**
(0.0003)
-0.0100**
(0.0006)
-0.0044**
(0.0005)
Legacy carriers 
only
-0.0004
(0.0003)
0.0047**
(0.0001)
-0.0103**
(0.0002)
-0.0029**
(0.0002)
Excluding UK 0.0002(0.0004)
0.0021**
(0.0002)
-0.0112**
(0.0003)
-0.0022**
(0.0003)
Excluding UK, 
legacy only
0.0001
(0.0004)
0.0010**
(0.0003)
-0.0121**
(0.0004)
-0.0008**
(0.0002)
Dependent 
variable – 
logarithm of 
load factor
Entire sample 0.0578**(0.0024)
0.0170**
(0.0007)
0.0001
(0.0015)
-0.0149**
(0.0011)
Legacy carriers 
only
0.0502**
(0.0013)
0.0117**
(0.0004)
-0.0078**
(0.0007)
-0.0152**
(0.0005)
Excluding UK 0.0490**(0.0015)
0.0124**
(0.0006)
-0.0110**
(0.0010)
-0.0190**
(0.0007)
Excluding UK, 
legacy only
0.0425**
(0.0008)
0.0073**
(0.0004)
-0.0176**
(0.0006)
-0.0178**
(0.0006)
Notes:
5. All dependent variables, specifications, and sample sizes are identical to those reported in Table 4
6. P-values of Hansen statistic and coefficients on control variables are similar to those reported in 
Table 4
7. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses
8. Significance: ** -  5%; * - 10%
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Appendix
Timeline of Antitrust Immunity Granting Decisions on the Transatlantic Market:
January 13, 1993, Antitrust immunity involving KLM Royal Dutch Airlines and Northwest 
Airlines
May 20, 1996, United Airlines – Lufthansa pair granted antitrust immunity
June 14, 1996, Antitrust immunity granted to the following three pairs:
- Delta Air Lines – Swissair (the partnership ended on August 5, 2000)
- Delta Air Lines – Sabena (the partnership ended on August 5, 2000)
- Delta Air Lines – Austrian Airlines (the partnership ended on March 25, 2000)
Carve-outs: ATL-BRU, ATL-ZRH, CVG-ZRH
November 1, 1996, United – SAS receives antitrust immunity
December 3, 1999, Northwest – Alitalia granted immunity.  The partnership ended in 2000
May 11, 2000, Antitrust immunity is granted to the following pairs:
- American Airlines – Swissair (ended following Swissair bankruptcy on March 31, 2002)
- American Airlines – Sabena (ended upon Sabena bankruptcy on November 7, 2001)
January 26, 2001, United – Austrian, and United – Lauda granted antitrust immunity
January 18, 2002, Antitrust immunity granted to the following pairs of carriers:
- Delta Air Lines – Air France
- Delta Air Lines – Alitalia
- Delta Air Lines – Czech Airlines
April 4, 2002, Antitrust immunity granted to United Airlines – British Midland (BMI), 
conditional on open-skies agreement between US and UK within the next six months
July 30, 2002, Antitrust immunity granted to American Airlines – Finnair
November 22, 2002, Antitrust immunity granted to American Airlines – Swiss International 
Airlines (ended in 2005)
April 15, 2004, Antitrust immunity granted to American Airlines – SN Brussels Airlines
February 13, 2007, First multi-airline antitrust immunity granted to the alliance consisting of 
United Airlines and the following EU partners: Austrian, BMI, Lot Polish Airlines, Lufthansa, 
SAS, Swiss, and TAP Air Portugal (all members of Star Alliance)  
May 22, 2008, Six-way antitrust immunity granted to the following members of Skyteam 
Alliance: Delta, Northwest, Alitalia, Czech, KLM, Air France.  Note that same airlines’ first 
application for six-way immunity was denied on February 6, 2006
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